Syrië: geweldescalatie jegens christenen

In mei 2026 publiceerde de NGO Syrians for Truth and Justice (verder: STJ) het onderzoeksrapport “Al-Suqaylabiyah/Hama: Mass Violence in March 2026, Violations, and a Reconciliation Process that Ignores Rights”, dat mede door de EU gefinancierd is. Aanleiding is de geweldsescalatie in de christelijke plaats Al-Suqaylabiyah in de regio Hama op 27 en 28 maart 2026.

Het rapport beschrijft de volgende toedracht van gebeurtenissen:

According to the testimonies documented by STJ, the events began on “Al-Mishwar” Street, one of the vital thoroughfares in Al-Suqaylabiyah. The accounts indicate that an altercation broke out between youths from Al-Suqaylabiyah and others from the [Sunni] town of Qalaat al-Madiq, triggered by the verbal harassment of young women from the area. This occurred within a context that some testimonies describe as recurrent in previous periods, albeit without reaching the level of escalation witnessed in this incident. (p. 4)
(…)
After the incident rapidly escalated beyond the scope of a simple altercation, taking on a highly dangerous nature that directly threatened the safety of civilians, Public Security personnel arrived at the scene. However, testimonies do not suggest that this intervention contributed to an effective containment of the situation or prevented its development. Rather, corroborating accounts indicate that the events took an escalatory turn shortly after the altercation was broken up, transitioning from a limited confrontation to broader acts of assault. (…) The trajectory of events was not limited to the expanding scope of the initial altercation; rather, it transitioned within a short timeframe into a level of relatively organized mass violence. This involved the influx of large groups from outside the city—believed to be from the town of Qalaat al-Madiq and its vicinity—into Al-Suqaylabiyah. Testimonies indicate that this expansion was not spontaneous but occurred within the context of a clear mobilization, facilitated by the use of cars and motorcycles, without encountering any interception by the security checkpoints stationed at the city’s entrances. (p. 5)
(…)
These attacks were not limited to material damage but extended to include direct physical assaults, as in the case described by “Hazar” who indicated that a civilian was severely beaten and had his property stolen in the presence of nearby security personnel. (…) These accounts demonstrate that the violence was not confined to the public sphere but extended its impact into homes, where several witnesses reported a state of severe panic and fear that compelled them to take shelter inside closed rooms for hours. (…) there are clear indications that these attacks took on a discriminatory nature or were linked to religious identity, as testimonies indicate the utterance of offensive remarks during the attacks, as well as the presence of selective behavior in certain cases (…) Furthermore, the targeting of religious symbols was documented, including gunfire directed at a statue of the Virgin Mary, which carries implications beyond material damage and points to symbolic dimensions associated with identity and religious affiliation.
In their entirety, these incidents reflect the transition of events from a limited altercation into a wave of widespread collective violence, characterized by intensity, multiplicity in patterns of attack, and geographical expansion. This occurred within a context that reinforced the residents’ sense of insecurity and revealed alarming indicators regarding the potential for this type of escalation to recur in the absence of effective deterrence.
(p. 6,7)

De religieuze motieven van het geweld worden ook besproken op p. 9 en 11.

Overigens wijst de EUAA Country Focus van juli 2026 (p. 73,74) er op, dat ook meespeelt dat de bewoners van Al-Suqaylabiyah gehouden worden voor aanhangers van het regime van Assad, zoals New Arab bijvoorbeeld bericht:

During the conflict, Al-Suqaylabiyah became a “frontline town that saw a local mobilisation [as part of the pro-regime National Defence Forces],” explains Legrand, sandwiched between opposition-held Sunni towns and regime-controlled Christian and Alawite communities.
The town’s local militia was implicated in the destruction and looting of neighbouring Sunni villages. However, according to Legrand, “the idea that the local community was supportive of the regime is not the political reality; in general, there was a lot of dislike for the local warlord”.
Since the fall of the regime, tensions have intensified as Sunni communities associated with the opposition feel empowered and angry towards those they perceive as having aligned with the former regime.

Volgens de EUAA Country Focus (p. 35,73,74) speelt dit in meer regio’s in Syrië, waarbij vooral etnisch-religieuze minderheden slachtoffer zijn, waarmee ook de EUAA de religieuze component achter het geweld tegen de christenen en andere minderheidsgroepen onderstreept.

Het STJ rapport is voorts kritisch op de wijze waarop de autoriteiten een lokale verzoening willen bewerkstelligen:

despite its role in de-escalating the tension and escalation, this process raises fundamental questions regarding its adequacy in addressing the violations documented by the testimonies, particularly concerning the widespread acts of violence that targeted civilians and private property, and the nature of responsibility for them. Furthermore, the inclusion of clauses in the agreement such as the dropping of legal claims raises problematic issues regarding the possibility of holding those responsible for these acts accountable.
(…)
Moreover, the available data does not indicate that any official measures or reactions were taken regarding the manifestations of incitement and mobilization that preceded and accompanied the events, including the summoning of groups from outside the city to participate in the attacks. Testimonies and available materials demonstrate that this discourse entailed explicit, religiously motivated inflammatory remarks inciting violence, which constitutes a highly alarming indicator of the potential for this rhetoric to translate into acts of collective violence. The absence of any accountability for these acts exacerbates fears of cementing an environment that permits the recurrence of such violations and the subsequent potential for renewed violence. In particular, reducing what occurred to a mere incidental altercation without addressing the actual causes that led to the escalation renders any similar incident a probable gateway to a new escalation. (p. 8)

De rol van de veiligheidsdiensten wordt ook onder kritiek gesteld:

the presence of Public Security personnel at the scene was not accompanied by effective intervention to prevent or mitigate the attacks. While security patrols arrived at the scene following the initial altercation, testimonies report that subsequent attacks occurred and continued in the presence of these forces, without adequate measures being taken to stop them or disperse the assailants.
Some testimonies go further, reporting direct sightings of security personnel accompanying groups of assailants during their movements within the city. (…) the security agencies’ failure to effectively intervene to protect civilians and their property constitutes a breach of their mandated duty to protect. Meanwhile, any conduct involving the facilitation or condonation of the attacks, or participation therein, raises serious questions regarding the extent of compliance with legal obligations related to maintaining security, ensuring respect for the law, and preventing the occurrence of violations. (p. 10)

Het rapport wijst er ook op, dat de overheid de ernst van het geweld bagatelliseert:

the official narrative denies this depiction, asserting that security forces intervened to contain what it described as a “group fight,” that they detained a number of those involved, and that they contributed to restoring calm to the area. However, this discrepancy between the official narrative and the circulated testimonies and visual materials reinforces the need for an independent and transparent investigation into the nature of the security agencies’ role during the events. (p. 10)

Het rapport bevestigt tenslotte, dat er sprake was van een escalatie van frequent voorkomend religieus gemotiveerde intimidatie, provocatie en geweld jegens de bewoners van Al-Suqaylabiyah (p. 11,12).

Samenvattend

kan worden geconcludeerd:

• dat christenen niet alleen (en vaak ten onrechte) gezien worden als aanhangers van het vroegere regime van Assad, maar om die reden ook frequent doelwit zijn van intimidatie, provocatie en geweld dat voorts mede religieus gemotiveerd is;
• dat de Syrische autoriteiten de belofte van bescherming aan de christelijke minderheid niet waarmaken en kennelijk ook niet kunnen waarmaken;
• dat de Syrische autoriteiten het geweld tegen de inwoners van Al-Suqaylabiyah ten onrechte afdoen als een lokaal incident en niet bereid of bij machte zijn de dieperliggende factoren aan te pakken, maar in tegendeel de actoren van geweld feitelijk de ruimte geven om het geweld voort te zetten;
• dat de gebeurtenissen van 27 en 28 maart 2026 in Al-Suqaylabiyah geen op zichzelf staand incident is, maar een ernstige escalatie van stelselmatige intimidatie, provocatie en geweld tegen christenen dat ook elders in Syrië kan plaatsvinden en escaleren.

Het STJ rapport (p. 12) dringt aan op verder, grondig onafhankelijk onderzoek naar de gebeurtenissen in Al-Suqaylabiyah en op effectieve strafrechtelijke vervolging van de geweldplegers wat immers is uitgebleven. Zonder zulk diepgaander onderzoek en zonder blijk van effectieve bescherming van christenen tegen gewapende milities in de omgeving van Al-Suqaylabiyah of elders, kan naar het oordeel van onze stichting niet volgehouden worden dat vervolging voor christenen in Syrië slechts incidenteel is en dat christenen in het algemeen kunnen rekenen op de bescherming van de interimregering.